The Saudi Public Investment Fund is out, which means LIV Golf is on the market. But the league faces one giant hurdle as it holds on for dear life: Are private investors actually interested?
“The league is in free fall,” says one long-time American sports investor, who has direct knowledge of LIV’s efforts.
After years of nine-figure signing bonuses and eight-figure purses, LIV Golf faces a deeply uncertain future as a business. PIF announced Thursday that it is pulling its investment in LIV at the end of the 2026 season; an event scheduled for New Orleans this summer was postponed on Monday, with no new date set; and PIF chairman Yasir Al-Rumayyan stepped down from the league’s board of directors.
On Thursday, the league said it is focused on “securing long-term financial partners to support its transition from a foundational launch phase to a diversified, multi-partner investment model.” It also announced the creation of an independent board with two new members, Gene Davis and Jon Zinman. Davis is the CEO of a consulting firm that specializes in turnaround management, with past and current clients that include Spirit Airlines and Weight Watchers.
LIV Golf as we know it is on the brink. Al-Rumayyan and Greg Norman, the co-founders, are now both out, and it’s on CEO Scott O’Neil to devise and execute plan B: LIV is actively seeking private investors and sales of its 13 teams.
But a discouraging picture is emerging: Interest in LIV in its current form is scarce.
“They still have large payment obligations and they still have very large purses to pay out. So if you’re an investor looking at this, I don’t know how you step into it,” says one high-level sports investment banker.
Since first reporting on April 15 that the PIF was on its way out, The Athletic has had conversations with eight sports business heavyweights — from private equity executives to senior-ranking sports investment bankers and team owners — and the consensus was overwhelmingly consistent. Experts agree that LIV Golf will face a steep uphill battle without the Saudi’s $900 billion sovereign wealth fund sustaining its losses, and will be hard-pressed to find an investor willing to pick up where the league has left off: with billions of dollars down the drain and O’Neil admitting that profitability wouldn’t be achieved for 5-10 years.
The sources spoke to The Athletic on the condition of anonymity because of current or past involvement in the league’s sales efforts and to protect relationships in their industries. They all have knowledge of the LIV talks to lure investors and sponsors, and many of them have direct insight into the discussions.
“LIV is so far from cash flow break-even,” said one investor, who currently holds a stake in an F1 team. “The math is never going to work. The business model was around selling these franchises to get all that money out. But that investment thesis has completely failed. The teams are not recognizable entities. The Crushers are the Crushers because of Bryson DeChambeau. When he’s not there, who the f–k wants the Crushers?”
O’Neil and other LIV executives have financial metrics at the ready that they believe portray positive momentum. LIV continues to claim a 100 percent increase in revenue from 2024 to 2025, a meaningless figure according to experts interviewed for this story, while tracking $100 million ahead of its five-event revenue pace from 2025. But the league has never reported profits of any sort.
It has also reached $500 million in sponsorship revenue, yet the list of league sponsors includes Aramco, Maaden and Riyadh Air, all of which are connected to the PIF. LIV does not share what percentage of its sponsorship dollars can be attributed to Saudi-backed companies. O’Neil also says that four of the league’s events are expected to be profitable in 2026. And that 10 of the 13 LIV teams will achieve the same status in 2026. But LIV has yet to define profitability in association with these claims. Multiple investors questioned whether these numbers take into account the massive quarterly payments made to players with guaranteed contracts, like Jon Rahm and DeChambeau.
LIV Golf was given eight days to respond to The Athletic’s questions about its business model, but representatives ultimately declined to answer.
The inner workings of LIV Golf’s business model are a lot bleaker than what the league is boasting publicly. LIV spends over $100 million per month, according to the newsletter Money in Sport, and at least $30 million per tournament just on prize winnings for players and teams. In 2024, it lost $590.1 million in its United Kingdom-based entity alone, which does not include U.S-based operations. And despite all of this, LIV is targeting team valuations as high as $300 million for equity sales. Citi’s Global Sports Advisory is leading the effort on those transactions.
“I can’t imagine they’re worth more than $30 million,” said one prominent investor, with first-hand experience in selling team franchises and who has insight in LIV’s negotiations. “Those are financial metrics that, without Saudi support, aren’t there. They are wish list numbers.”
LIV Golf CEO Scott O’Neil celebrates Jon Rahm’s LIV Mexico City title. (Hector Vivas / Getty Images)
By comparison, TGL, the indoor simulator league with teams of four PGA Tour players, has seen success selling its franchises to private investors. The first six teams were sold for $35 million in 2023, before the league’s launch. Those franchises are continuing to court investors at higher valuations, with an expansion franchise for next season coming in at double that price, and a recent sale valuing one club at approximately $100 million. But TGL teams have a much easier path toward profitability. The teams do not incur facility costs due to the single-venue model, player compensation is handled through the parent company, TMRW Sports, and the league began with a high-visibility media rights deal with ESPN.
LIV is requiring potential investors to sign NDAs ahead of team investment discussions, according to one source, and began this process long before the PIF exited. There is a belief that LIV lost its window to complete those sales, as the lack of Saudi funding leaves the league indefinitely unstable.
“A process that is successful involving team sales evolves as a result of the strength of the underlying business,” the same investor said.
LIV’s global schedule is seen as an asset by the league, and it has created well-attended, successful events in Australia and South Africa. But it has also contributed to a lack of exposure in the critical North American TV market. It took LIV three seasons to secure a broadcasting deal with a major American TV network, Fox Sports. But that arrangement was essentially a time buy — LIV handled all the production for broadcasts, and Fox paid the league a nominal fee, according to sources briefed on the deal. Its streaming and international media rights amount to minimal revenue as well. The PGA Tour, on the other hand, has a nine-year domestic media rights deal that is valued at approximately $6 billion.
“LIV does not have a life after the PIF. They could not get a media contract, and you just can’t make an expensive league work without a media contract,” says another sports investor, who owns majority stakes in multiple American sports teams.
Industry experts disagree with LIV’s valuation on teams like the Crushers. (Johan Rynners / Getty Images)
According to experts, a previously unrecognizable version of LIV could emerge from this moment. One investor floated the possibility of LIV becoming a four-event series, and fitting more seamlessly into the golf ecosystem that way, continuing successful events like LIV South Africa or LIV Adelaide. Or LIV could become a domestic product in Saudi Arabia, perhaps if it is sold to a member of the Saudi royal family, similar to PIF’s recent sale of Saudi Pro League soccer club Al Hilal to Kingdom Holding Company.
“I think it’s going to be very hard to raise anywhere close to the amount of money that they’ve been burning. Even if they cut it in half, it’s still going to be incredibly difficult,” the investment banking executive says.
LIV is in a weak position because its business is currently upheld by unlimited spending. There is a business model LIV could adopt that would be substantially cheaper to operate. But that structure means smaller purses and no guaranteed contracts to players. What is LIV Golf without massive prizes and big-name players? The Athletic reported earlier this month that Bryson DeChambeau is already taking meetings should he not renew his contract with LIV. Without DeChambeau, who is a free agent at the end of this season, LIV is on its deathbed.
Historically, it is not out of the question for buyers to be interested in the significantly dampened version of a startup.
LIV is on sale as a distressed asset, for which there is a market. Just perhaps not enough of one to justify the five years and billions of dollars spent to get to this point.
“There are always opportunistic investors who look for a chance to pick up assets for pennies on the dollar,” says another investor. “Whether we are at that juncture at this point, time will tell. But it would not be shocking if that were the case. There are always buyers. But buyers at what price?”
The Athletic‘s Matt Slater and Andrew Marchand contributed reporting to this story.